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This paper asks the following two questions: First, can a model with
nominal rigidities in wage and price setting account for the average welfare
costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations identiﬁed in Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-
Salido (2003)? Second, do we need to agree on a particular scheme for
nominal rigidities to answer that question? We compute a quadratic approx-
imation to agents expected lifetime utility and evaluate welfare for different
modeling schemes of nominal rigidities that all have the same average du-
ration of contracts. Calvo (1983) wage and price contracts can deliver size-
able welfare costs, but other contracts of the same average stickiness cannot.
Calvo (1983) contracts can imply welfare costs that are up to 4 times higher
than those implied by overlapping contracts in the spirit of Taylor (1980) or
Wolman (1999). Furthermore, the sticky information framework of Mankiw
and Reis (2002) may generate welfare costs that are even smaller. This paper
calls for more research into the origins of wage and price stickiness.
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11 Introduction
The welfare costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations have been at the center of macroe-
conomic research since the seminal paper by Lucas (1987). Lucas (2003) focused
on the variability of consumption and has argued that the costs of these ﬂuctua-
tions are very small, roughly 0.07 percent of steady state consumption. His con-
clusion is that macroeconomists should set their research priorities on improving
economic growth rather than on ﬁne tuning of the cycle. Recently, Gali, Gertler,
and Lopez-Salido (2003) have built a measure of the costs of business cycle ﬂuc-
tuations centering around the gap between the marginal product of labor and the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, the so-called ”ef-
ﬁciency gap”. They calibrate a small number of parameters and take that measure
to U.S. data. Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2003) show that the average wel-
fare costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations could very well be higher than what Lucas
(2003) computes. Costs in the benchmark calibration of Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-
Salido (2003) are 0.28 per cent of steady state consumption and range up to 0.75
per cent.
Variations in the efﬁciency gap arise endogenously in models with wage and
price stickiness such as in the seminal work by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin
(2000). As pointed out by Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2003), there are how-
ever a number of other frictions that could also contribute to the variance of this
gap.
This paper asks the following two questions: First, can a model with nomi-
nal rigidities in wage and price setting account for the average welfare costs of
business cycle ﬂuctuations identiﬁed in Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2003)?
Second, do we need to agree on a particular scheme for nominal rigidities to an-
swer that question?
Addressing the ﬁrst question helps to understand the sources of ﬂuctuations
in the efﬁciency gap and delimits the welfare gains from improved monetary pol-
icy. The second question needs a bit more justiﬁcation. Most monetary dynamic
general equilibrium models with optimizing agents are silent about the origins of
wage and price stickiness. Instead, the empirical observation of infrequent nomi-
nal adjustment is used to motivate monetary models with mostly ad-hoc features
of nominal rigidities.1 Since we have little theoretical guidance as to how to in-
1It should be noted that such exogenous imposition of nominal rigidities does not square well
with a main reason for using structural macroeconomic models: The hope to obtain relationships
which are invariant to policy by explicitly modeling how agents optimize in the environment they
are facing. For instance, in the framework of Calvo (1983) wage and price setting, it may be
doubted that the probability of price and wage adjustment is invariant to the costs of non adjust-
ment. That costs depends crucially on the weight the central bank puts on the wage versus price
inﬂation in an interest rate rule and is therefore not at all invariant to policy.
2troduce nominal stickiness, we compute the welfare costs of nominal rigidities
across a host of popular modeling devices for stickiness. Should we ﬁnd similar
welfare costs across these devices, one could argue that agreeing on a particular
scheme for nominal rigidities is not of major importance.
This paper is related to recent work by Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004)
as well as Ascari (2004) and Kiley (2002). Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2004)
compute the cost of nominal inertia in a more elaborate New Neoclassical Synthe-
sis model with Calvo (1983) contracts. They show that the cost of nominal inertia
can be much larger than the welfare costs of business cycles identiﬁed by Lucas
(2003). However, Ascari (2004) and Kiley (2002) have shown that the choice of
a modeling device for nominal rigidities may have serious consequences for the
steady state effects of inﬂation. Monetary general equilibrium models that feature
steady state inﬂation often assume that agents can index their contracts to the trend
inﬂation rate, thereby completely bypassing the point made in Ascari (2004). It is
an open question, to what extent the ﬁndings of Kiley (2002) and Ascari (2004)
are also relevant for the costs of nominal rigidities over the business cycle. We
are motivated by these three papers to undertake a comparison of welfare costs of
wage and price stickiness across different popular modeling devices for nominal
rigidities.
We build on the seminal paper by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) featur-
ing nominal stickiness in wage and price setting. The models of nominal rigidities
we consider are the following: Random price adjustment of Calvo (1983), N pe-
riod overlapping contracts as in Taylor (1980), a more general scheme with time
varying adjustment probabilities as suggested by Wolman (1999) and ﬁnally a
variant of the sticky information framework of Mankiw and Reis (2002). The
choice of these four modeling devices is motivated by the following facts. First,
a fair comparison between all of these models is possible by requiring an equal
average duration over which contracts or information sets are ﬁxed. In such a way
no model implies more exogenous stickiness on average. Second, welfare costs
of all schemes can be easily computed using modiﬁcations of the linear-quadratic
framework of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). Third, the considered schemes
cover most of the devices used in monetary models. Fourth, all of these models
imply that the welfare cost of nominal rigidities stem from the dispersion of dif-
ferentiated goods across producers or of differentiated labor across workers. Thus
we consider a homogenous family of modelling devices for nominal rigidities.2
The schemes suggested by Taylor (1980), Wolman (1999) and Mankiw and
2An often used scheme missing from this comparison is Rotemberg (1982) quadratic adjust-
ment costs. We do not consider it here, since it does not belong to the family of rigidities that
imply dispersion of output across ﬁrms or hours across workers. Furthermore, the derivation of
welfare based loss function is not as easily done as with the other schemes.
3Reis (2002) all relax at least one unpleasant assumption of the frequently used
Calvo(1983)contracts. Taylor(1980)contractstruncatetheinﬁnitehorizonpresent
in the expectation formation of price and wage setters in the scheme of Calvo
(1983). Wolman (1999) additionally relaxes the assumption that adjustment prob-
abilities are independent of time since last adjustment. Finally, the Mankiw and
Reis (2002) scheme provides a tractable behavioral foundation for stickiness by
considering limited capacity to process information. We derive purely quadratic
utility based loss function from the model corresponding to these four different
schemes of nominal rigidities and computes welfare based on a linear approxima-
tion to the equilibrium conditions.
To preview our main results brieﬂy. Large costs wage and price stickiness
arise almost exclusively under the assumption of Calvo (1983) contracts, while
the costs implied by the other contracts are much smaller. It therefore appears that
the main welfare relevant choice a modeler is faced with is whether to assume the
inﬁnite horizon scheme of Calvo (1983) or to use any one of the ﬁnite horizon
schemes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the model,
which is similar to the basic framework in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). In
section 3, we introduce Calvo (1983) wage and price setting as our baseline model
of nominal rigidities. The reader familiar with both the model of Erceg, Hender-
son, and Levin (2000) and the setup of Calvo (1983) may skip these sections and
proceed to section 4 where the log-linearized necessary conditions for equilib-
rium are collected and the model’s baseline calibration is presented. Section 5
computes the welfare costs of nominal rigidities for the Calvo (1983) scheme. In
section 6 we make an important robustness checks in our baseline model. Taking
up recent criticism of the rental market assumption by Danthine and Donaldson
(2002) and others, we allow capital to be ﬁrm speciﬁc rather than assuming that
it can be costlessly and instantaneously reallocated across ﬁrms. In section 7 we
depart from Calvo (1983) and allow for the above mentioned alternative plausible
assumptions about price and wage setting. Finally, section 8 summarizes the ﬁnd-
ings and concludes. A technical appendix with derivations and proofs is available
from the author upon request.
2 Model
The model we consider bases its key building blocks on Erceg, Henderson, and
Levin (2000). In particular, capital is in ﬁxed supply in the aggregate. We ab-
stract from aggregate capital accumulation, because the derivation of a welfare
based loss function becomes extremely cumbersome with aggregate capital accu-
4mulation. 3 In the baseline model, we assume that there exists an economy wide
rental market that allows capital to move freely between ﬁrms. This assumption is
relaxed in a robustness check. We assume further that subsidies exists that com-
pletely offset the effects of monopolistic competition in the steady state in order
to avoid highly involved derivations of the loss function that would arise with an
inefﬁcient steady state.4 Finally, following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000)
we assume that households can fully insure against the idiosyncracies in income
streams arising from nominal wage rigidities. While this may bias the welfare
costs of nominal rigidities, it greatly facilitates the analysis. In the next subsec-
tion we start with a discussion of the households problem.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households with unit mass indexed by h. Households are
inﬁnitely lived, supply labor Nt(h) and receive nominal wage Wt(h), consume
ﬁnal goods Ct(h), and purchase state contigent securities Bt(h). Furthermore,
they are subject to lump sum transfers Tt, hold nominal money balances Mt(h)
and receive proﬁts Γ(h)t from the monopolistic retailers. The utility function is
assumed to be separable in consumption, real money balances and leisure. The
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Here Bt is a row vector of state contingent bonds, where each bond pays one unit
in a particular state of nature in the subsequent period. The column vector δt+1,t
represents the price of these bonds. Therefore, the inner product gives total expen-
ditures for state contingent bonds. τw is a wage subsidy used to offset the steady
state effects of monopolistic competition The ﬁrst order conditions for consump-
tion and state contingent bond holdings give rise to the standard Euler equation.
Note that consumption is perfectly insured against idiosyncratic labor income and
3Edge (2003) derives a quadratic the loss function for a model with aggregate capital accumu-
lation.
4This task has recently accomplished by Benigno and Woodford (2004).











t is the nominal interest rate on a non-contingent bond. We follow the
standard practice to omit the ﬁrst-order condition for money holdings as this equa-
tion merely serves to back out the quantity of money that supports a given nominal
interest rate.













A continuum of households supply differentiated labor Nt(h), which is aggre-









, k > 1. (4)







Here Wt is the Dixit-Stiglitz wage index.
2.2 Production
Firms in the ﬁnal good sector produce a homogeneous good, Yt, using interme-
diate goods, Yt(z), as input in production. There is a continuum of intermediate
goods of measure unity. The production functions that transforms intermediate










where  > 1. The solution to the problem of optimal factor demand yields the







6A continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods ﬁrms in-
dexed by z ∈ [0,1] and owned by consumers uses both labor Lt(z) and capital




At denotes total factor productivity, which follows an exogenous stochastic pro-
cess. Capital is freely mobile across ﬁrms rather than being ﬁrm speciﬁc. Firms
rent capital from households in a competitive market on a period by period ba-
sis after they observe the productivity shock. Firm z chooses Lt(z) and Kt(z) to





tLt(z) + ZtKt(z) s.t. AtLt(z)
1−αKt(z)
α − Yt = 0. (9)
Here, wr
t is the real wage and Zt the real rental rate for capital. Let Xt(z) denote
the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the constraint. The ﬁrst order conditions
with respect to Lt(z) and Kt(z) are given by
w
r










The ﬁrst order conditions imply that all ﬁrms choose the same capital to labor
ratio, therefore marginal cost Xt is equalized across ﬁrms. This will not be true
for the case of ﬁrm speciﬁc capital, where the immobility of capital across ﬁrms
prevents ﬁrms from choosing equal capital to labor ratios.
2.3 The efﬁciency gap
In order to compute welfare, it is useful to consider the solution under perfectly
ﬂexible wages and prices. Up to a ﬁrst order approximation in log deviations5











UC is the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption evaluated
at the steady state and ω2 ≡
VNN ¯ N
VN is the elasticity of the marginal utility of labor.
The subutility function U(Ct) ≡
C1−σ
t





5Throughout this text, for any variable Xt, ¯ X denotes its steady value and ˆ Xt ≡ logXt−log ¯ X
7we have ω2 = χ. Given these functional forms, the natural level of output in






χ + α + (1 − α)σ

b At (13)
One can use this equation together with the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition for labor
demand, to derive a key equation for this model. That equation links marginal cost
to the output gap and the gap between the average marginal rate of substitution
















When there are no nominal rigidities in the labor market, the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and labor is equal to the real wage and the
last term in brackets vanishes. We then recover the condition from sticky price
models that marginal cost is log-linearly related to the output gap. When prices
are perfectly ﬂexible as well, the marginal product of labor is equal to the real
wage, i.e. log marginal cost is zero. It follows that the output gap is zero. These
two gaps, the difference between the real wage and the marginal product of labor
and the difference between the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution are
combined into a single efﬁciency gap in the welfare analysis of Gali, Gertler, and
Lopez-Salido (2003).
3 Calvo wage and price setting
In this subsection, we outline Calvo (1983) wage and price setting as our reference
model of nominal rigidities. In our baseline Calvo (1983) model, we assume that
ﬁrms are fully rational and purely forward looking, while we allow for backward
looking elements in price setting as a robustness check. In any given period, a
ﬁrm faces a constant probability θ of receiving a signal that allows that ﬁrm to
reset its price. Firms that do not receive the signal, carry on the prices posted in
the last period and satisfy any demand at that price. The problem of a ﬁrm that
receives a signal to change its price in period t is to maximize expected real proﬁts
as valued by the household in those states of the world where the price remains


























6Here we have made use of properties of the Cobb-Douglas Production function, rewriting
total cost as marginal cost times production.
8Here, Λt+i is the households marginal utility of consumption in period t+i and τt
is sales subsidy suitably chosen as to offset the steady state effects of monopolistic
competition (1 + τp = 
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As a robustness check, we allow for backward looking elements in the wage
and price setting as proposed by Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) and Gal´ ı, Gertler, and
Lopez-Salido (2001), since that allows to match the observed persistence in in-
ﬂation rates. In particular, we assume that price setters that do receive a signal
to re-set their price belong to one of two groups. The ﬁrst group sets prices in a
purely forwardlooking manner as outlined above. The second group of measure
ω is comprised of backward looking ﬁrms that set their price according to the














This rule posits that backward looking ﬁrms adjust prices according a geometric
average of prices changed last period adjusted for last periods inﬂation rate. The









Since the fraction of ﬁrms that can change the price is chosen randomly and by





t−1 + (1 − θ)(1 − ω)(P
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This setup gives rise to the following hybrid new Keynesian Philips curve
b πt =









Here ζ ≡ θ + ω[1 − θ(1 − β)] and πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1.
Wage setting is modeled in exactly the same way as price setting. The forward
looking household that receives a signal to change the wage maximizes expected
utility through choice of the nominal wage W ∗
t subject to the demand curve and



















9We again assume that those households that do receive a signal to reset their
wages belong to one of two groups. A measure ϕ of backward looking households

























Since the fraction of wage setters that receive the signal to change their wage
is randomly chosen and by the law of large numbers, the aggregate wage index





t−1 + (1 − θw)(1 − ϕ)(W
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This setup gives rise to a hybrid new Keynesian wage Philips curve
c πw
t =















4 The key equations and model calibration
In this section, we collect necessary conditions that must be satisﬁed by equilib-
rium sequences of allocations and prices for the case of Calvo (1983) wage and
price setting. The model has 7 endogenous variables: price inﬂation πt, wage in-
ﬂation πw
t , labor Lt, output Yt, marginal cost Xt, nominal interest rate Rn
t and the
real wage wr
t. The model’s equilibrium conditions are summarized in the follow-
ing box. The monetary policy rule necessary to close the model is not listed as it
will be varied in our calculations of welfare costs of wage and price stickiness.
































b Yt = b At + (1 − α)b Lt (29)
c wr
t = b Xt + b At − αb Lt (30)
∆c wr
t = c πw
















b At =ρ b At−1 + ut (33)
Here:
b µt ≡ χb Lt + σb Yt − c wr
t
ζw ≡ θw + ϕ[1 − θw(1 − β)]
ζ ≡ θ + ω[1 − θ(1 − β)]
Upper case letters denote the aggregate of the respective lower case variables.
(26) is the consumption Euler equation. (27) and (28) are the wage and price
Philips curves. (29) is the log-linearized production function, which deserves
some explanation. It has been pointed out by Yun (1996) that the full non-linear














dz and ˆ Dt = θ ˆ Dt−1 (34)
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) have shown that the price dispersion
term can be ignored for a log-linear analysis around a steady state that features
zero price dispersion. One can further show that this term evolves as a univari-
ate AR(1) regardless of the fraction of backward looking price setters by log-
linearizing the price index and the price dispersion term. Therefore, we can safely
ignore this term in our log-linear analysis. (30) is the ﬁrm’s labor demand func-
tion. (31) is an identity deﬁning the change of the real wage. (31) links marginal
cost to the output gap and the ”wage gap”. It is not a necessary equation for gen-
eral equilibrium, but is needed to compute the loss function. The wage gap is the
11difference between the average marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and labor on the hand and the real wage on the other, see proposition ?? in
the appendix. Finally, the last equation is the exogenous stochastic process for
total factor productivity.
We use the baseline calibration from the sticky price model of Pappa (2004)
andassumesymmetricpriceandwagesettingparameters. Inparticular, themarkup
is 14 % in both goods and labor markets, resulting in κ =  = 7.88. Further-
more, we assume that prices and wages are ﬁxed on average 4 quarters, such that
θ = θw = 3
4. In our baseline calibration, we set the fraction of backward looking
agents in both price and wage setting to 0 and vary this parameter in a robustness
check. The labor share in production 1 − α is set to 0.65. We set the coefﬁcient
of relative risk aversion σ to 2 and assume a Frisch (constant marginal utility of
wealth)elasticityoflaborsupplyof 1
3, implyingχ = 3. Theexogenousprocessfor
technology follows an AR(1) with autoregressive parameter equal to 0.906. The
innovation has standard deviation equal to 0.00852. Finally, the time preference
rate is matched to yield an annual real interest rate of 1.03, i.e. β = 1.03−0.25.
5 Welfare costs with Calvo contracts
This section computes welfare costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations stemming from
nominal rigidities in wage and price setting. The welfare measure is the expected
discounted lifetime utility of a randomly drawn household. As is common in the

















E0 is an expectation conditional on a particular initial state vector or an assump-
tion on the distribution of the initial state vector. Let W∗
t denote period utility
under perfectly ﬂexible wages and prices. The consumption equivalent welfare
measure L ≡ −
P∞





can be approximated up to second
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2 + ˜ λ3c πw2







L gives the onetime increase in consumption, expressed as a percentage of period
consumption in the steady state, necessary to make agents as well off in a world
with nominal rigidities as in a world with perfectly ﬂexible wages and prices.
12Since this loss function is free of ﬁrst moments, it can be accurately evaluated by
considering a linear approximation to the models equilibrium conditions. Here,
the weights are given by
˜ λ0 =0.5
θ























Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004b) have noted that the ranking of monetary policy
rules can in principle depend on the assumed distribution of the initial state vector.
We have considered two cases. First we condition the initial state vector to have
zero variance, i.e the economy is in the deterministic steady state at time zero.
Second we condition the covariance matrix of the initial state vector to be equal
to its long run unconditional covariance matrix. In that case the welfare measure
is equal to (1 − β)−1 times the unconditional expectation of period utility. We
found that both measures give roughly the same welfare costs and therefore only
report the second measure in our tables. The model’s parameters give rise to the
following weights in the loss function:
˜ λ0 = 46.26, ˜ λ1 = 3.57, ˜ λ3 = 740.87 (42)
Note that the weight on wage inﬂation is roughly 16 times larger than on price
inﬂation for our benchmark calibration despite the fact that the average duration
of wage contracts is the same as for price contracts. This is a result of a low wage
elasticity. With sticky wages labor supply is demand determined. The inverse of
the labor supply elasticity signals how much compensation in terms of real wage
the household requires for supplying an extra unit of labor. When wages are sticky
households are induced to vary their labor supply without any such compensation
taking place. Therefore, it is clear that the inverse of the labor supply elastic-
ity is closely related to the welfare cost of wage inﬂation. For instance, setting
χ = 1 brings the weight on wage inﬂation relative to price inﬂation down to 3.1
for our benchmark calibration. Another important parameter determining the rel-
ative weight is the wage elasticity of labor demand κ. The higher this parameter,
the more substitutable are different varieties of labor in production. Differences
in relative quantities of labor demanded by the labor aggregator are a function
13of differences in relative wages posted and that function is increasing in the sub-
stitutability (κ) of labor varieties in the aggregator. For instance, reducing the
markup in both labor and goods market to 10% (κ =  = 11) increases the rela-
tive weight on wage inﬂation stabilization to 22.
We now turn to the computation of the welfare costs given a variety of interest
rate rules of the form:
ˆ it = (1 − α2)α0





+ (1 − α2)α1ˆ πt + α2ˆ it−1 (43)
We consider the following interest rate rules, whose coefﬁcients are summarized
in Table 1. Rule 1 is our benchmark rule estimated on quarterly U.S. data over
Table 1: the considered rules
α0 α1 α2
Rule 1: estimated 0.09 2.13 0.78
Rule 2: estimated, no output gap 0.00 1.90 0.77
Rule 3: Taylor (1993) 0.50 1.50 0.00
the sample 1980:1-2004:2.7 Rule 2 is an estimated rule where the response to the
output gap is restricted to zero. The reason is that the output gap is typically only
marginally signiﬁcant or even insigniﬁcant and that the adverse welfare effects
of reacting to a wrong measure of the gap can be very large, see Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2004a). We ﬁnally consider the classical Taylor (1993) rule. It has
been shown by Gerlach-Kristen (2004) that a Wald test cannot reject the null of a
cointegrating vector with such coefﬁcients for the Euro area data. Thus, such an
interest rate rule can be seen as a very crude approximation to ECB behavior.
In Table 2 on the next page the welfare measure is displayed for various frac-
tions of forward and backward looking wage and price setters given our three
considered rules.
7All data is taken from the FRED2 database. The inter-
est rate is the end of quarter federal funds rate available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FEDFUNDS/downloaddata/FEDFUNDS.txt.
It is converted to quarterly decimal rate by dividing by 400. The output gap is
constructed as the log difference between quarterly real GDP and potential real
GDP as constructed by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce. The series are available
at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC96/downloaddata/GDPC96.txt and
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPPOT2/downloaddata/GDPPOT2.txt, respec-
tively. Inﬂation is constructed as the log of the ﬁrst difference of the GDP price index available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPCTPI/downloaddata/GDPCTPI.txt. All data except
potential GDP are seasonally adjusted. All coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant at standard levels.
14Table 2: Welfare costs of nominal rigidities with mobile capital
(ω,ϕ) L(rule 1) L(rule 2) L(rule 3)
(0,0) 23.262 35.415 18.559
(0.5,0) 23.446 35.153 19.492
(0,0.5) 23.453 34.204 23.793
(0.5,0.5) 23.542 33.805 24.873
The table shows that the welfare costs of nominal rigidities vary across the as-
sumed monetary policy rules and across the degree of backward looking wage and
price setters. For our baseline choice of purely forward looking price and wage
setters as well as the estimated monetary policy rule 1, the welfare costs are equiv-
alent to a one time increase in consumption of roughly 23 per cent of steady state
consumption. Given our calibration for the discount factor β this is equivalent to a
compensating variation of 0.17 per cent of steady state consumption in every pe-
riod. That number is roughly comparable in magnitude to the benchmark estimate
in Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2003) for the welfare costs of business cy-
cles. Backward looking elements in wage and price can have an ambiguous effect
on the welfare costs of nominal rigidities. As pointed out in Amato and Laubach
(2003) (for backward looking price setters only), the Phillips curve changes in two
ways. First it becomes more inertial, since lagged inﬂation enters that equation.
Ceteris paribus, any given shock implies a longer lasting effect on the price and
wage level and therefore more dispersion of relative prices and relative wages. At
the same time, the slope of the Philips curve with respect to marginal cost de-
creases, implying that any given shock to marginal costs has a smaller effect on
inﬂation. Which effect dominates is a priori ambiguous and depends on the policy
rule in place. 8
Weconcludethatallowingforbackwardlookingagentsaltersthewelfarecosts
of nominal rigidities, but not by huge amounts. When considering alternative
schemes of nominal rigidities, we do not include a discussion of backward looking
elements in order to keep the comparison small. We next turn to checking the
robust of our results when varying an important assumption about the real side of
the economy.
8Amato and Laubach (2003) shows that the welfare loss of optimal policy increases with the
degree of backward looking price setters. For a given non-optimal policy rule that we consider,
this need not be the case.
156 Robustness checks for the baseline Calvo model
So far we have assumed that capital is freely mobile across sectors and can be
reallocated as to equalize the shadow value of capital across ﬁrms. It has been
argued by Danthine and Donaldson (2002), Woodford (2003, p.166) and others
that capital cannot be instantaneously be relocated across ﬁrms. Danthine and
Donaldson (2002) view it as unreasonable that it is too costly to post a new price
tag, but that it is costless to unbolt machinery and ship it between ﬁrms. Further-
more, Eichenbaum and Fischer (2004) show that departing from the assumption
of perfect capital mobility is necessary to reconcile the Calvo (1983) model with
the data. Sveen and Weinke (2004) further discuss the implications of modeling
capital for the equilibrium dynamics in sticky prices models
For the purpose of business cycle analysis, capital might better be modeled as
being ﬁrm speciﬁc. In this subsection, we solve the ﬁrms price setting problem
when capital is ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level. The problem of the ﬁrm is now to choose
its optimal nominal price P ∗





























∂Pt(z) = − 
1−α
Lt+j(z)
Pt(z) , the ﬁrst order condition






















Curve is given by
b πt =
(1 − ω)(1 − θ)(1 − βθ)
ζ
(1 − α)











t is average marginal cost. Since capital is ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level, the
capital-labor ratio differs across ﬁrms and so does marginal cost.
For the case of immobile capital, the coefﬁcient ˜ λ0 in the loss function changes








(1−θ)(1−θβ) and ˜ λ2 adjust accordingly. When we assume
that capital is ﬁxed at the level of an individual ﬁrm, the weight on price inﬂation
in the loss function rises roughly by a factor 5 to 242.536, while the weights
on the variability of the output gap and wage inﬂation remain the same. Firm
16speciﬁc capital implies that a given dispersion in relative quantities results in a
much bigger dispersion of labor across ﬁrms. Capital is ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level,
the ﬁrm can only adjust labor to vary production. Since labor has decreasing
marginal product in production at the level of the individual ﬁrm, the dispersion
of labor across ﬁrms is welfare reducing.9 Therefore, the weight attached to price
inﬂation rises strongly with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital.
A greater coefﬁcient on price inﬂation variability in the loss function does
not imply that the considered interest rate rules will lead to a higher loss with
ﬁrm speciﬁc capital than with mobile capital. The reason is that the structural
equations change, too. In particular, the slope of the price Philips curve also falls
by roughly factor 5 from 0.0852 to 0.0162. A given disturbance to marginal cost
results in much less price inﬂation with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital. To understand why
the equilibrium variance of inﬂation falls, consider the problem of a ﬁrm that
receives a signal to change its price. By setting a lower price than the ﬁxed price
ﬁrms it can attract additional demand. But with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital marginal
cost depends on the ﬁrms’ own level of production while it only depends on the
aggregate production level with a common rental market. Therefore, the ﬁrm will
choosearelativepricethatdeviatesfromunitybylesswhenmarginalcostdepends
on own output and therefore on its relative price. As a result the variance of price
inﬂation is smaller with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital.10 Table 3 displays the welfare costs
associated with our simple rules for the case of immobile capital.
Table 3: Welfare costs of nominal rigidities with immobile capital
(ω,ϕ) L(rule 1) L(rule 2) L(rule 3)
(0,0) 18.950 30.353 14.872
(0.5,0) 19.858 30.668 17.143
(0,0.5) 19.140 29.906 17.945
(0.5,0.5) 19.777 29.747 20.532
Whether we model capital as ﬁxed at the ﬁrm level or assume a rental market
does not have a large effect for the benchmark calibration of this model. Price
9If production were linear in labor, the weights attached to price inﬂation variability would be
the same across mobile and ﬁrm speciﬁc capital. Dispersion of labor across ﬁrms would still be
welfare reducing, but only because it is identical to the dispersion of output across ﬁrms. Since
each variety has decreasing marginal product in the bundler, dispersion of output is again welfare
reducing.
10See Kimball (1995) for a discussion of assumption on factor markets on price setting and Ball
and Romer (1990) for the seminal paper on real rigidities.
17dispersion is more costly with ﬁxed capital, but the variance of inﬂation is also
smaller. The two effects can roughly offset each other. This result depends cru-
cially on the concavity of the production function with respect to labor, i.e. on
alpha. The welfare loss with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital increases monotonically alpha
approaches unity, but remains bounded when we assume a rental market. For
alpha close to unity the welfare costs with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital can therefore be
much larger than under the rental market assumption. The table shows that the
loss with ﬁrm speciﬁc capital is generally somewhat lower for the policy rules
considered, but the difference is not huge. In broad terms, the picture emerging
from Table 2 is similar to that from Table 3. Therefore, we proceed with the case
of mobile capital only.
7 How special is Calvo pricing?
TheweakestelementinNewKeynesianmodelsisclearlythemodelingofnominal
rigidities. There is strong disagreement on why prices or wages are sticky or how
to best model price and wage setting behavior. Despite this lack of consensus, the
apparatus of Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) has emerged as an often unquestioned
standard in the analysis of welfare effects of monetary policy. It is used in im-
portant contributions such as Pappa (2004), Kollmann (2004), Kollmann (2002),
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) or Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
The apparatus of Calvo (1983) has been criticized by a number of authors.
Danthine and Donaldson (2002) consider the possibility of rationing. For ﬁrms
who last changed their price a long time ago, that price may no longer be above
marginal cost given today’s demand. For those ﬁrms the individual rationality
condition that positive proﬁts are earned at the marginal units sold may be violated
and they might be better off by simply not producing the extra units.
Recently, Ascari (2004) and Kiley (2002) have pointed out that Calvo (1983)
pricing implies much more price dispersion induced by steady state inﬂation than
Taylor (1980) pricing. Ascari (2004) considers a standard New Keynesian model
withtrendinﬂationandCalvopricing, wherethoseﬁrmsthatarenotre-optimizing
their price cannot adjust for trend inﬂation. He computes that a trend inﬂation rate
of 5 % generates a steady state loss11 of output relative to the zero inﬂation case
of 11.5 % with Calvo (1983) pricing, but only by 0.5% with Taylor (1980) pricing
of the same average duration over which prices are ﬁxed. The reason is that trend
inﬂationtranslatesintomuchmorepricedispersionwithCalvo(1983)pricing. We
are motivated by these ﬁndings to undertake a systematic quantitative comparison
11The loss reported here refers to the case ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital and a markup of 10%. The loss
is only 3% when there is an economy wide rental market for capital.
18of welfare effects of monetary policy across different assumptions about wage and
price setting. We go beyond the analysis of Ascari (2004) and Kiley (2002) and
improve upon them, by undertaking a full welfare analysis rather than computing
output dispersion in the steady state.
Following Wolman (1999), we nest all considered models of price and wage
setting as special cases of the following set up. Limited ability to reset prices is de-
scribed by a vector α. The j-th element of that vector is the probability that a ﬁrm
adjusts its price in period t, conditional on the previous adjust having occurred in
period t − j. The vector α can be speciﬁed in any way the researcher chooses.
One can deduce from α a vector ω, denoting the fraction of ﬁrms charging prices
set in period t − j. The Wolman (1999) scheme is very ﬂexible, it encompasses
Taylor (1980) overlapping contracts as a special case and can approximate Calvo
pricing for large J.
There are two key difference between the Calvo (1983) price setting scheme
and the scheme proposed by Wolman (1999). The ﬁrst is that Calvo (1983) has an
inﬁnite tail: for any integer J there is a nonzero fraction of ﬁrms that last adjusted
their price J periods ago. In the scheme considered here, J is ﬁnite. Furthermore,
the probability that a ﬁrm adjusts its price in any given period is independent of
the time elapsed since last adjustment under Calvo (1983) pricing. A ﬁrm that
has not adjusted its price for say 20 years is just as likely to keep the price ﬁxed
in period t as a ﬁrm that has last adjusted its price in period t − 1.12. Both the
inﬁnite tail and the constant adjustment probabilities of Calvo (1983) are often
considered to be unrealistic. Nevertheless, the Calvo (1983) scheme is often used
under the implicit assumption that these particularities do not inﬂuence welfare
computations by much.
In the following subsection, we derive the models equilibrium equations for
the case of Wolman (1999) wage and price contracts. Taylor (1980) contracts are
a special case of the former. Therefore, a separate discussion of equilibrium with
Taylor (1980) contracts is not necessary.
7.1 Wage and Price setting with the Wolman (1999) scheme
For wage setting according to the Wolman (1999) scheme, the ﬁrst order condition





















12Of course, the fraction of ﬁrms that have not adjusted their 20 years ago is small.
19We denote by φw
j the probability that a wage set in period t is still in place in









































t+k, i.e wage inﬂation between periods t and t+j, i.e inﬂation
between periods t and t + j. At any point in time there are Jw such conditions
determining the aggregate wage index, corresponding to the FOC of wage setters
in the current and previous J − 1 periods.
For the case of a general wage setting scheme with Jw cohorts, the ﬁrst order

































Recall that we had introduced the notation ˆ µt for the difference between the
marginal rate of substitution and the real wage: ˆ µt ≡ χˆ Lt + σ ˆ Ct − ˆ wr
t. We
can see that the wage chosen by households in period t differs from the aggregate
wage index to the extend that agents expect gaps between the marginal rate of
substitution and the real wage and to the extent that they expect wage inﬂation.
Agents look at most J − 1 periods into the future and if φj is strictly decreasing
in j then they attach a smaller weight to variables farther into the future.





















Similarly, for price setting we have that the following ﬁrst order conditions for the
optimal nominal price P ∗





















Here, πt,j ≡ Π
j
k=0πt+k, i.e inﬂation between periods t and t + j. For the case
of a general price setting scheme with Jp cohorts, the ﬁrst order condition log-

































Firms charge a price that is different from the current price level, if the expect log
marginal cost ˆ Xt differs from zero and if price inﬂation is expected. From the




















For the case of Wolman (1999) rigidities, one can derive a relation between ag-



















For this pricing scheme it is also possible to show that the price dispersion term
can be ignored for a log-linear analysis around a steady state with zero price dis-
persion. One can log-linearize the price dispersion term together with the aggre-
gate price index to show that ˆ Dt = 0 up to ﬁrst order.
Equilibrium sequences for allocations and prices in the model with Wolman
(1999) rigidities must then satisfy (26), (29) - (33), the monetary policy rule as
well as Jp equations of the type in (53) and of Jw equations of the type (49)
together with (55) and (51).



































with: ˜ λ0 =
1
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t−j ≡ c P ∗
t−j − b Pt and similarly for c w
t−j. For the case of Taylor (1980)
contracts, the sum of the weights on price and wage dispersion is 3.94 and 63.11,
respectively. The weight on the output gap remains at 3.57 as for the case with
21Calvo(1983)contracts. Itisevidentthattheweightsattachedtopriceinﬂationand
wage inﬂation in the loss function fall by roughly factor 11 relative to the Taylor
(1980)13 setting. However, by inspecting how the weights in the loss function
change, one cannot infer much about the change in equilibrium welfare when
switching from Calvo (1983) to Taylor (1980). The reason is that while weights
in the loss function go down, equilibrium variances generally go up.
7.2 Welfare costs of nominal rigidities with the Wolman 1999
scheme
We require that the average duration over which a contract is ﬁxed is the same
across all considered schemes of price and wage setting, respectively. Using the













j=0(1 − αj) (58)
For Calvo (1983) pricing, J = ∞, αj = (1 − θ) for j = 1,2,... and c = θ. The











Prices and wages are ﬁxed for at most 4 periods in all cases considered, i.e.
α4 = 1. We consider contracts that all have an average duration of 3 quarters:
3 period Taylor contracts (αj = 0 for j = 1,2 and α3 = 1), truncated Calvo
(αj = 0.19 for j = 1,2,3) and a more general upward sloping scheme in the
spirit of Wolman (1999) (α1 = 0.05,α2 = 0.255,α3 = 0.52).
The welfare losses relative to the ﬂexible price allocation is displayed in Table
4
Table 4 shows that for our two estimated rules, Calvo (1983) price and wage
settingimplies muchlargerwelfarelosses thananyofthe schemeswithﬁnitehori-
zon. Note that these differences arise despite the fact that the average duration of
wage and price contracts is equal across all considered schemes. For the estimated
interest rate rule, the welfare costs of price and wage stickiness are several times
higher with the Calvo (1983) scheme than with any of the ﬁnite horizon adjust-
ment schemes. It therefore appears that price and wage setters last adjusting their
13It is clear that welfare cannot be expressed as a function of the variance of wage and price
inﬂation and the output gap alone. However, the variance of wage inﬂation is a good summary
statistic for the variance of the relative contract wages entering the loss function.
22Table 4: Comparison of rules across wage and price setting schemes
interest rate rule L (Calvo) L (tr. Calvo) L (Taylor) L (Wolman)
Rule 1 17.458 4.822 4.296 4.543
Rule 2 24.109 5.643 4.845 5.242
Rule 3 24.526 15.513 15.901 15.318
contract long ago matter for welfare despite the fact that they have increasingly
smaller share in their respective population. Whether we assume Taylor (1980) or
truncated Calvo (1983) or the more ﬂexible scheme of Wolman (1999) does not
matter much for welfare computations.
7.3 A variant of Mankiw and Reis (2002): Sticky information
The last modeling device for price and wage stickiness we examine is a variant
of the sticky information framework of Mankiw and Reis (2002). These authors
build an alternative framework around the notion that agents have limited capac-
ity to process information. In particular, they assume that in any period only a
randomly chosen fraction of ﬁrms updates their information set. Firms are free
to change their price in any period based on the information they have available.
The price level is therefore determined by a weighted average of expectations of
current optimal price based on information sets at all past periods in time. As with
Calvo (1983) pricing, the weights attached to these prices decay geometrically.
We build a N-period version of the model by Mankiw and Reis (2002). In par-
ticular, we assume that no ﬁrm or household operates with information outdated
longer than one year, i.e. N = 4. As with Wolman (1999) contracts, the arrival
of new information is described by a vector α. The generic entry αj denotes the
probability that a ﬁrm that last updated its information set in t − j periods ago
receives a signal to update the information set in period t. Similarly, one can de-
duce from α a vector ω giving the fractions of ﬁrms charging prices based on the
information sets in periods t − j, for j = 0,1...,N − 1. In order to keep the
amount of exogenous stickiness comparable to the earlier models, we require that
the average duration of an information set is again equal to 3 quarters.
Such a price and wage setting scheme has several attractive distinctions rela-
tive the Calvo (1983) model. First, steady state inﬂation is completely neutral in
this setup, therefore avoiding the huge costs of steady state inﬂation of the Calvo
(1983) model pointed out in Ascari (2004). Second, while Calvo (1983) price set-
23ters must choose one price which does well on average over the inﬁnite weighted
future, sticky information ﬁrms can change their price in any period. Even ﬁrms
that do not receive new information will change their price in any period, as long
as the state variables evolve in an autoregressive manner.14
Equilibrium sequences for allocations and prices in the model with sticky in-
formation must then satisfy (26), (29) - (33), the monetary policy rule as well
as the following conditions stemming from wage and price setting. Let W ∗
t,t−j
and P ∗
t,t−j denote the nominal optimal wage and nominal price chosen at time t
based on an information set last updated at time t − j. We deﬁne the optimal-
ity in conditions in terms of stationary variables ˆ w∗
t,t−j ≡ ˆ W ∗
t,t−j − ˆ Wt−j and
ˆ p∗
t,t−j ≡ ˆ P ∗








t−k − ˆ w
r
t + χˆ Lt + σˆ Yt for j = 0,1,...,N






ˆ πt−k + ˆ Xt for j = 0,1,...,N
p − 1 (61)
The log-linearized price and wage indices (normalized by the current price level

































(60) indicates that the Nw cohorts of households set their nominal wage such
that in conditional expectation based on the respective information sets15, the real
wage equals the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
Similarly, (61) indicates that Np cohorts of ﬁrms set their price such that in condi-
tional expectation based on their respective information sets, price equals nominal
marginal costs. It is again easy to show that the price dispersion term affecting the
non-linear aggregate production function is zero up to ﬁrst-order and can therefore
be ignored.
14Since the exogenous stochastic process is highly autocorrelated this is clearly the case in our
model.
15Expectations based on past information sets do not ﬁt the standard setup for solving linear
rational expectations models. Using a simple trick outlined in McCallum (2001) it is easy to cast
this problem in the form necessary for standard solution codes.
24The loss function for the sticky information model is the again of the form
(57). In that formula, one must simply substitute b p∗
t−j with the expectation based
on the information t − j periods ago of the optimal price and c w∗
t−j with the
expectation based on the information t − j periods ago of the optimal wage.
In the following table we display the welfare losses associated with different
monetary policy rules and different assumptions about the arrival rates of new in-
formation. Recall that the j-th entry in the vector α denotes the probability that
any given price or wage setter receives the most recent information set, condi-
tional on last having received an information update j periods ago. The column
truncated refers to a model where αj = 0.19 for j = 1,2,3, the column stag-
gered αj = 0 for j = 1,2 and α3 = 1 and ﬁnally the column increasing refers to
α1 = 0.05,α2 = 0.255,α3 = 0.52. Note that this is completely analogous to the
cases considered for Wolman (1999) pricing.
Table 5: Comparison of rules across different sticky information schemes
interest rate rule L(truncated) L(staggered) L(increasing)
Rule 1 4.968 4.237 4.912
Rule 2 3.107 2.690 3.097
Rule 3 11.406 11.500 11.663
One can see that the welfare costs of Mankiw and Reis (2002) price and wage
setting are the smallest of all schemes considered.16 Relative to the standard Calvo
(1983) contract with average duration of 3 periods, the Mankiw and Reis (2002)
scheme implies welfare costs that are only roughly a quarter as big. In particu-
lar, the welfare costs of nominal inertia are of a similar order of magnitude as the
welfare costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations that Lucas (2003) suggested. Compar-
ing the costs of truncated Calvo (1983) with those of truncated Mankiw and Reis
(2002), one ﬁnds that sticky information implies sizeably smaller welfare costs.
This is important since ad-hoc models of nominal rigidities are often justiﬁed by
arguing that agents have imperfect capacities to constantly compute and post the
optimal price. Our comparison suggests it may well make a difference for welfare
comparisons whether one explicitly models imperfect ability to process informa-
tion as in Mankiw and Reis (2002) or resorts to more ad-hoc models of price
setting.
16Whether this is a general result that holds for any monetary policy rule considered is an open
question.
257.4 Why is the Calvo scheme so special?
Apparently, the Calvo (1983) scheme for nominal rigidities has quite different
implications for the welfare costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations than the ﬁnite
horizon schemes. To explain why this is the fact, we construct a 20 period ap-
proximation to the inﬁnite horizon model of Calvo (1983). The probabilities that
a contract is ﬁxed for j = 1,...,19 periods are identical to the Calvo model. All
contracts that have not been updated in any of these periods are updated in period
20. This implies that we cut the Calvo (1983) tail after covering 99.98 percent
of wage and price setters. By constructing such an approximation to the Calvo
(1983) scheme, we can quantify the contribution of particular cohorts of wage
and price setters to the overall welfare costs.
In the following ﬁgures, we plot the percentage contribution of each cohort


















l , representing the share of ﬁrms or workers having contracts
that were last updated j periods ago. For better visibility, we have scaled these
weights by a constant such that the ﬁrst weight is equal to the contribution of
cohort 1 to welfare.









































contribution of cohort j to loss
weights of cohort j
Figure 1: welfare decomposition by price setter cohorts
Figure 1 shows that the contribution of the cohorts of price setters to welfare
does not follow the pattern of the weights, i.e. their population share. The frac-
tion of ﬁrms that last adjusted their price j periods ago, ω
p
j decays geometrically.
However, the variance of the relative price ˆ P ∗
t−j − Pt generally increases with j.
In particular, cohorts 5 to roughly 15 contribute more than proportionally to the
26welfare loss. The Calvo (1983) scheme is often defended by arguing that the ad-
mittedly implausible assumption that certain contracts remain in place for a very
long time does not matter much, because these contracts make up only a very
small fraction of the total. Our point is to stress that contracts that have been ﬁxed
5 − 15 periods ago contribute signiﬁcantly to welfare and contribute much more
than can be deduced by just looking at their population share.












































contribution of cohort j to loss
weights of cohort j
Figure 2: welfare decomposition by wage setter cohorts
The same pattern is evident for wage setters. Again, the contributions to wel-
fare does not follow the pattern of the population share of individual cohorts.
Here, the discrepancy is even more pronounced, as indicated by the strong hump
shaped pattern for the contracts of intermediate duration. The two ﬁgures taken
together also point out that nominal wage rigidities account for a larger share of
the overall welfare costs than price rigidities.
8 Summary and conclusion
This paper has asked two questions. First, can a simple general equilibrium model
with sticky wages and prices account for sizeable welfare costs of business cycle
ﬂuctuations as identiﬁed in Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2003)? The answer
is a qualiﬁed yes. Assuming Calvo (1983) wage and price contracts with average
duration of 4 quarters our benchmark calibration delivers welfare costs that range
from 0.14 to 0.23 per cent of period consumption as can be deduced from the ﬁrst
row in Table 2 on page 15 after multiplying by (1-β). That is smaller than the
benchmark estimate of the cost of business cycles Gali, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido
27(2003) of 0.28, but roughly on the same order of magnitude. The answer is only
a qualiﬁed yes, since Calvo (1983) pricing is special. What scheme for nomi-
nal rigidities we assume matters strongly for the welfare costs of our considered
monetary policy rules. Calvo (1983) contracts can deliver welfare costs that are
up to 4 times higher than ﬁnite horizon schemes of the form suggested in Taylor
(1980) or Wolman (1999). It is again stressed that the differences arise despite the
fact that all schemes assumes an equal average duration of exogenous stickiness.
Assuming a sticky information scheme similar to Mankiw and Reis (2002) with
the same degree of average duration of the information set delivers welfare costs
that are even smaller. The ﬁnding that Calvo (1983) pricing involves much larger
welfare losses favours the view that state dependent pricing rules such as Dotsey,
King, and Wolman (1999) should receive much more attention.
The apparent differences in the welfare costs of rigidities across the various
schemes point to the answer to the second questions. Agreement on how to
model nominal rigidities seems is necessary to make precise quantitative state-
ments about the welfare costs of wage and price stickiness. Our relatively simple
exercise that only changes the distribution of price and wage duration already
shows large differences in welfare across scenarios.
We conclude by by discussing our ﬁndings in more detail and relating it to
the existing literature. Comparing Taylor (1980) and Wolman (1999) contracts to
the Calvo (1983) scheme, we ﬁnd that the fact that wage and price setters look
inﬁnitely far into the future in the Calvo (1983) model matters a lot. Despite the
fact that both schemes imply the same average duration of price and wage con-
tracts, welfare costs in the Calvo (1983) model can be up to 3 times higher than
those under Taylor (1980) contracts. This result arises, because the equilibrium
dispersion of output across producers and labor across households is strongly in-
ﬂuenced by wages and prices set far out in the tail of the distribution of relative
prices and wages, respectively. Therefore, truncating the tail of that distribution
as done by Taylor (1980) has important consequences for welfare. Our analysis
seems to suggest that the exact distribution of price and wage contract duration
does not matter much once the tail is cut. Therefore, it appears that the main mod-
eling choice is whether to follow the widely used Calvo (1983) scheme or not. A
point similar to ours is brought fourth by Kiley (2002) and Ascari (2004). These
authors considered only steady state inﬂation, not the welfare costs of business
cycle variations. In fact, their analysis suggests costs that are roughly 10 higher in
the inﬁnite horizon scheme of Calvo (1983) than under the ﬁnite scheme of Taylor
(1980). We show that when one is concerned with the welfare costs of nominal
rigidity over the cycle rather than in the steady state, these numbers fall strongly.
The reason is that trend inﬂation is unidirectional such that ﬁrms farther and far-
ther out in the distribution of the Calvo (1983) tail necessarily charge a nominal
28price that is more and more eroded in real terms. With zero steady state inﬂation
and business cycle shocks this need not be true. Shocks are positive and negative
and it may happen that the price of a ﬁrm having last optimized its price a long
time ago is close to the one of a ﬁrm that is currently optimizing. Therefore, it is
intuitively clear that business cycle shocks generate less relative price dispersion
than trend inﬂation. This feature explains why in our study, welfare costs of Calvo
(1983) contracts exceed the costs of Taylor (1980) contracts, but not by as much
as in the analysis of Kiley (2002) and Ascari (2004).
Turning to the case of Mankiw and Reis (2002) sticky information we ﬁnd
further implications for the welfare costs of nominal rigidities. Mankiw and Reis
(2002) model incomplete capabilities of agents to process information in highly
stylized and mechanical fashion as an infrequent update of information sets. Our
welfare analysis suggests that for the monetary policy rules considered here, the
costs of nominal rigidities introduced in such a fashion are smaller than those of
similar Taylor (1980) or Wolman (1999) contracts. The reason is that wage and
price setters generally choose to change their wages and prices even if they do
not receive any new information due to the autoregressive nature of the state vec-
tor. Therefore, sticky information schemes of a given average duration typically
involve less price and wage stickiness than Taylor (1980) contracts of the same
duration.
Finally, we note some limitations of the current analysis and directions for fu-
ture research. This paper has not taken the different schemes for nominal rigidities
to the data. It appears highly desirable to spell out the implications for the model’s
second moments of different schemes of nominal rigidities. Which scheme is
more realistic can probably not be determined without the need to consult micro
data on price and wage adjustment as well as macro data on aggregate time series.
Furthermore, it is not clear that our main ﬁnding that ﬁnite horizon schemes im-
ply smaller welfare costs than the Calvo (1983) scheme is general. Our results are
dependent on the particular monetary policy rules chosen. Finally, one would like
to know whether our main points would also go through in a more complex model
set-up. We currently answer the same set of questions in a more realistic model
with capital accumulation, habit formation, etc. That analysis requires the use
of numerical second-order solution of the type suggested in Schmitt-Groh´ e and
Uribe (2004c). Preliminary results suggests that our ﬁndings still hold broadly in
such a setting.
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